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Internet security and technology policy research regularly uses technical indicators of abuse in order to identify culprits and
to tailor mitigation strategies. As a major obstacle, readily available data are often misaligned with actual information needs.
They are subject to measurement errors relating to observation, aggregation, attribution, and various sources of heterogeneity.
More precise indicators such as size estimates are costly to measure at Internet scale. We address these issues for the case
of hosting providers with a statistical model of the abuse data generation process, using phishing sites in hosting networks
as a case study. We decompose error sources and then estimate key parameters of the model, controlling for heterogeneity
in size and business model. We find that 84 % of the variation in abuse counts across 45,358 hosting providers can be
explained with structural factors alone. Informed by the fitted model, we systematically select and enrich a subset of 105
homogeneous “statistical twins” with additional explanatory variables, unreasonable to collect for all hosting providers. We
find that abuse is positively associated with the popularity of websites hosted and with the prevalence of popular content
management systems. Moreover, hosting providers who charge higher prices (after controlling for level differences between
countries) witness less abuse. These factors together explain a further 77 % of the remaining variation, calling into question
premature inferences from raw abuse indicators on security efforts of actors, and suggesting the adoption of similar analysis
frameworks in all domains where network measurement aims at informing technology policy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Abuse data is an important foundation for security and policy research. It associates technical iden-
tifiers – typically IP addresses, domain names or URLs – with malicious activities, such as spam,
infected machines, command-and-control servers, and phishing sites.
Scientific studies and industry reports draw on abuse data to make inferences about the security
efforts of the parties in charge of the networks or services where the abuse is located. Concentrations
of abuse are seen as evidence of poor security practices or even criminal behavior, explicitly or
implicitly characterizing certain providers as “rotten apples”, or at least as actors who can and
should do more remediation [Goncharov 2015; Hao et al. 2013; Czyz et al. 2014; Stone-Gross et al.
2009; Shue et al. 2012; Noroozian et al. 2015].
Industry representatives often counter these kind of inferences when they make media headlines.
For example, a 2013 McAfee report ranked the Netherlands as number three worldwide in hosting
botnet command–and–control (C&C) servers [Intel Security 2013]. A leading news organization
concluded: “Netherlands Paradise for Cybercriminals”, prompting a debate that reached the na-
tional parliament [Nederlandse Omroep Stichting 2013]. The Dutch Hosting Provider Association
responded that it “disagrees vehemently” with this conclusion [Dutch Hosting Provider Associa-
tion 2013]. It argued that the high ranking was an artifact of the large hosting infrastructure in the
country, not of any negligence or malice on the part of providers.
The hosting provider association raised a valid point. We know that concentrations of abuse are,
to a large extent, a function of the size of the network and the service portfolio of the provider,
rather than of the provider’s security effort [Clayton et al. 2015]. More customers, for example,
mean higher numbers of compromised accounts.
At the heart of such disagreements is the issue of discretion: the degree in which provider efforts
drive their abuse levels. Or conversely: the degree in which abuse levels indicate the security efforts
of a provider. The core question of this paper is to what extent abuse levels are determined by the
security efforts of individual providers versus being a function of structural features of the industry.
More colloquially: are abuse levels driven by rotten apples or an overall bad harvest?
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A major obstacle for making valid inferences from abuse measurements is the fact that the techni-
cal indicators are often misaligned with actual information needs. They are subject to measurement
errors relating to observation, aggregation, attribution, and various sources of heterogeneity such
an unreliable size estimates. Whilst the fact that size – as one of the many providers’ structural
properties – matters sounds rather obvious, the exiting body of work have not yet controlled for
this effect in a systematic and statistically sound manner. Most of the related studies who study the
concentrations of abuse in a network, often correlate or normalize abuse with a size estimate as a
proxy for the number of customers, whilst such methods often fall short if one does not control for
other structural or security-effort related provider properties [Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Shue et al.
2012].
Therefore, to advance our ability for making more reliable inferences from abuse data, in this pa-
per, we develop an analytical approach and propose a statistical model of the abuse data generation
process to understand to what extent are abuse levels determined by the security efforts of individ-
ual providers versus being a function of structural properties of the industry? We use phishing abuse
data as a case-study to demonstrate our approach. In short, we make the following contributions:
— We present a scalable approach to study abuse across the population of hosting providers, as
opposed to technical entities such as Autonomous Systems, using passive DNS and WHOIS data;
— We replace existing regression models to explain abuse with a more sophisticated modeling ap-
proach that carefully decomposes different sources of variance at work in the generation of abuse
data;
— Our approach is able to distinguish security efforts from structural properties of providers when
explaining concentrations of abuse in networks. In a case study on phishing data, we show that
over 84% of the variance in abuse data can be explained by the structural properties of providers,
such as their size and business model. This implies that security efforts only have a minor impact
on abuse counts;
— We develop an approach using ’statistical twins’ to measure the impact of factors that are difficult
to measure at scale. Using this approach, we present the first empirical evidence of the impact
of pricing, time-in-business and the amount of Wordpress sites on phishing abuse. Together with
other factors related to provider business models, we are able explain a further 77 % of the remain-
ing variation in abuse, while controlling for country-level effects using fixed-effect model;
— We demonstrate how our approach generates comparative abuse metrics by controlling for the
structural differences among providers. Such relative metrics are more suited to evaluate counter-
measures than absolute counts and concentrations of abuse.
Measurements of the absolute amount of abuse across providers are clearly relevant, assuming
they are attributed correctly to the appropriate agent. They fall short, however, when establishing
agency, developing interventions and holding individual providers accountable. Our approach is
an alternative that allows actors to take into account a wider range of factors and support more
informative inferences from abuse data for security and policy issues.
In the following Section 3, we outline the analytical approach that sets up the rest of the paper.
Section 4 describes data sources and collection methodology. Section 5 describes our modeling
approach and interprets the results. In Section 6, we add additional provider structural properties for
sample of enriched data points. In Section 7 we evaluate the impact of measurements errors around
abuse data and size estimates. Section 2 covers the related work. Finally, we discusses our main
conclusions and implications in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
There is an enormous amount of work on methods for detecting abused resources. The blacklists
based on these detections have also been extensively studied [Pitsillidis et al. 2012; Kührer et al.
2014]. Observational data on abuse incidents is the starting point for our study. We do not engage
with the detection methods themselves and therefore will not survey them here.
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Closer to our research is the rich body of work that identifies and explains patterns in abuse data.
The explanations are situated at different levels of analysis: (i) individual resource (host, IP address,
domain); (ii) network, or other aggregates of individual resources; (iii) actor, meaning the economic
entity providing the resources or otherwise responsible for them; and (iv) country. We briefly survey
relevant work at each level.
Individual resources. A variety of studies have been very effective at explaining or predicting
the occurrence of abuse, such as compromised websites, from the properties of individual resources,
such as webserver software versions [Vasek et al. 2016; Soska and Christin 2014]. The factors
identified in these studies impact the distribution of abuse across providers, e.g., if customers of
a provider use popular software with known vulnerabilities, then the abuse rate will go up. Others
used DNS-specific characteristics to predict whether domain names are malicious [Bilge et al. 2011;
Hao et al. 2011]. More tailored towards phishing, some methods propose to detect phishing websites
using URL and content-specific features [Rosiello et al. 2007; Whittaker et al. 2010].
Networks. Another strand of work looks at how abuse is distributed across aggregate units of
resources, such as address blocks, Autonomous Systems (ASes) [Levchenko et al. 2011; Noroozian
et al. 2015] or top-level domains (TLDs) [Aaron and Rasmussen 2015a]. These studies often iden-
tify concentrations of abuse in certain networks [Ramachandran and Feamster 2006; Collins et al.
2007; Levchenko et al. 2011] and then identify network features that correlate with abuse rates, such
as poor network hygiene [Zhang et al. 2014; Stone-Gross et al. 2009] or rapidly changing network
connectivity [Shue et al. 2012; Wagner et al. 2013; Konte et al. 2015]. These studies aim to detect
malicious or poorly managed networks, rather than disentangling the factors explaining the causal
relationship of why abuse is concentrated there or how it is distributed across all networks. Further-
more, to be useful for interventions and policy, the aggregated resources need to be attributed to the
relevant actor. For drawing inferences about providers, an explicit attribution methodology needs to
be in place. This takes us to the third level of analysis.
Actors. Actors are the economic entities that operate the resources or are otherwise responsible
for them. Work at this level has to bridge the gap between the technical identifiers in abuse data, like
Autonomous Systems (ASes) and the organizations responsible for those resources. This is hardly
straightforward since many Internet Service Providers (ISPs), for example, operate multiple ASes
[Asghari et al. 2015b] and many hosting providers, on the other hand, operate with on average seven
other providers in the same AS [Tajalizadehkhoob et al. 2016].
Our work is situated at this level. We are not aware of any work that explains abuse patterns
across hosting providers. Somewhat related is a study of security practices in a small sample of
providers [Canali et al. 2013]. More mature work is available for the domain name space. Studies
have identified which registrar or registries are associated with malicious domains and how they
could intervene [Liu et al. 2011; Hao et al. 2013; Levchenko et al. 2011].
Countries. The highest level of analysis is countries. Work in this area studies the relationship
between country-level factors, such as GDP, rule of law and ICT development, and the distribution
of abuse, most notably infected hosts [Asghari et al. 2015a; Garg and Camp 2013; Wang and Kim
2009; Kleiner et al. 2013].
Our study extends the prior work in a variety of ways. Despite the existing work, we are not
trying to find technical features to correlate with abuse, but we are trying to understand to what
extent are abuse levels determined by the security efforts of individual providers versus being a
function of structural properties of the industry? For that, first we adopt a better attribution method
for identifying the relevant actors, by moving from ASes to hosting providers, to whom the IP
space is allocated. We restrict our analysis of abuse to phishing instances, as a case study, and
we fit a advanced statistical model to grasp the extent to which we can explain the reason behind
heterogeneity observed in abuse counts of hosting providers. Our model includes a set of important
explanatory factors, some of which such as size of IP space has been partially explored before, and
others such as portion of shared hosting business, hosting price, time in business and the amount
of Wordpress sites which are studied for the first time in our paper. In addition, we advanced our
analysis by controlling for country-level effects in our models.
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Fig. 1. Overview of our analytical approach
3. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
To assess the driving forces behind abuse levels of hosting providers, we need to disentangle a
variety of factors and errors at work in abuse counts. Figure 3 summarizes these sources of variance
and provides an overview of our approach. We assume that abuse observations are driven by two
phenomena: explanatory factors (left) and measurement errors (right).
We divide the explanatory factors into defender properties and attacker behavior. Defender prop-
erties are then branched to two main groups: structural and security effort related properties. Rele-
vant structural properties of defender include the size of the provider, as recognized in earlier work
[Clayton et al. 2015; Noroozian et al. 2015; Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Konte et al. 2015]. Simply
put, the more domains or IP addresses a provider hosts, the higher the odds of incurring an abuse
incident, as there is a larger number of potential victims in the network.
In addition to size, the business type is relevant. Providers offer different portfolios of hosting
services, e.g., unmanaged, dedicated, shared, Virtual Private Server, etc. These services differ in the
extent to which the provider is responsible or in a position to provision security [M3AAWG 2015].
Business type also includes the pricing strategy. Other characteristics include the legal framework
under which providers operate and the overall maturity of ICT infrastructure development in a
country. Last, but not least, the security efforts of the providers will influence the abuse rate.
Next to explanatory factors, we distinguish measurement errors that cause variance in the abuse
counts: biases in observations (for factors and abuse data) and problems in attributing abuse inci-
dents to the responsible entity.
To find out to what extent defender properties explain the variance in the abuse counts of hosting
providers, we develop a statistical modeling approach and implement it for a one type of abuse data
as a case-study: phishing domains. The blue text in Figure 3 indicates how we deal with the various
sources of variance decomposed by the analytical model. We first apply Poisson Generalized Linear
Models (GLMs) to the number of phishing domains per provider, and estimate the coefficients for
four structural defender properties related to size and business type (detailed in Section 4). These
variables can be economically collected for all hosting providers.
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Some additional structural defender properties are more cumbersome to collect, since they require
manual work or are costly to others when measured at scale. A statistician’s response would be
to estimate from a random sample. The size of a random sample depends on the target level of
confidence and on the effect size (akin the signal-to-noise ratio). In the case of hosting providers,
the heterogeneity in the population may hide subtle effects of security effort, which would require
uneconomically large samples to control for.
A more efficient approach is to modify the sampling strategy and select subsets of cases which
appear homogeneous according to the observable defender properties. Specifically, we select a set of
“statistical twins” – subsets of size two – covering the domain of the known population. We collect
additional variables for each twin. The subsequent analysis looks for factors explaining differences
within twins, disregarding differences between twin. Technically, this can be achieved by adding one
fixed effect per subset to the GLM specification. This method allows us to control for large parts of
the heterogeneity and at the same time account for linear bias introduced by the systematic sample
selection.
Another way of looking at this approach is that we select the a priori most informative cases
from the population for further analysis. It rests on the implied assumption that cases which have a
twin in the population do not systematically differ from those which do not. We assume that this is
plausible for the population of global hosting providers.
Of course, there are always further factors that remain unobserved. The same holds for the se-
curity efforts of providers. We have no direct observations of these efforts, which means that they
are part of the unexplained variance in our model. All unobserved factors, such as missing defender
properties, attacker behavior, together with all measurement errors, are conflated in the unexplained
variance of the model. We establish the boundaries of the impact that all these unobserved factors
have. In other words, we show that even though there is a lot we cannot observe, the few things we
can observe explain a big portion of the variance in the abuse counts.
We follow the former interpretation and account for it as measurement error that we can attenuate,
if not avoid completely. Specifically, we reduce attribution errors in identifying hosting providers
by replacing routing data (BGP), the typical basis for attribution, with WHOIS to map domain names
and IP addresses in passive DNS data to their corresponding hosting providers. Avoiding obser-
vational biases is outside the scope of this paper, but we limit their effect on our core results by
cross-validation against a different set of phishing data. Finally, we test the robustness of the size
estimates in the model against errors due to possible model mismatch by simulating the impact
of distorted defender properties against a simulated phishing count variable drawn from an ideal
Poisson distribution model.
4. DATA
Our study deploys a variety of data sources, which are summarized in Table I.
4.1. Hosting provider identification
We want to accurately identify which IP ranges belong to actual hosting providers. Most of the
existing work uses BGP data to map IP addresses of abuse incidents to ASes, equating the latter
with hosting providers. However, the entity that is routing an IP address is not always the same as
the entity hosting an IP address. WHOIS data provides more direct visibility into who is responsible
for an IP address. In should be noted that WHOIS data comes with its well-known limitations such as
different data formats, they are less detrimental on analysis of the hosting market than starting with
BGP [Elliott 2008]. Cai et al. [Cai et al. 2010] describe a general method for mapping IP addresses
to their organizations using WHOIS. We refined this method for the hosting market.
In a nutshell, we only map organizations which host domains seen in DNSDB, a passive DNS
database that draws upon hundreds of sensors worldwide and which is generously provided to us by
Farsight Security [Farsight Security 2016; DNSDB 2016]. The data contains second-level domain
names and the IP addresses that they resolved to. To our knowledge, DNSDB has the best cover-
age of the domain name space available to researchers. We take the IP addresses and domains seen
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:6 Tajalizadehkhoob et al.
in DNSDB in 2015 and map them to their corresponding organizations using WHOIS data and the
MaxMind API [MaxMind 2016; Liu et al. 2015]. To compile a final set of organizations who offer
hosting services, we adopt some of the keywords and categories suggested in [Tajalizadehkhoob
et al. 2016; Dimitropoulos et al. 2006] and then exclude educational and government-related orga-
nizations from our set. The final set consists of 45,358 hosting providers.
4.2. Abuse data
In order to answer the main question of the paper, we model the count of abuse in the networks
of hosting providers, using phishing data as a case-study. The main reason behind this choice
is, since phishing sites are known to be mostly compromised accounts [Aaron and Rasmussen
2015a], bypassing security is very much required in the bulk of cases. To that end, we analyze
phishing domains collected from two sources: the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [Anti-
Phishing Working Group 2016] and Cyscon GmbH [GMBH. 2016].
APWG data contains domains of phishing domains from all over the world, blacklisting times,
and other meta-data. We collect the IP addresses associated with second-level domains1 in the
APWG feed by retrieving the corresponding passive DNS entry at the time when the domain is
blacklisted. The final set consists of 131,018 unique second-level domains and 95,294 unique IP
addresses for the whole year 2015.
Cyscon phishing data has the same attributes (URLs, IP addresses, blacklisting times, meta-
data). We collect 40,292 second-level domains and 23,021 unique IP addresses for June–December
2015.
We use the phishing second-level domains in APWG data as the default response variable in our
regression models in Section 5 and 6. In Section 7, we use the Cyscon data to cross-validate the
results.
4.3. Provider properties
To explain the differences in phishing incident counts between hosting providers, we collect a num-
ber of variables on provider (defender) properties, some for the entire population and some for the
sample of “statistical twins”.
4.3.1. Variables collected for all providers. In addition to identifying providers, we can collect
variables related to size and business model (see the leftmost factors in Fig. 3) from passive DNS
and WHOIS data.
Number of assigned IP addresses. Size of IP address block(s) assigned to a provider based on
WHOIS.
Number of IP addresses hosting domains. Count of IP addresses seen to host domains in pas-
sive DNS. The combination of these two variables provides information about the kind of business
the hosting provider is running. For instance, providers who use a large part of their assigned IP
space for hosting domains such as webhosting providers can have a different business model from
providers who use their IP space for hosting other services such as data centers.
Number of hosted domains. Count of the second-level domains in the passive DNS data. In
addition, note that since the first three variables have a skewed distribution, we log-transform them
with base 10.
Percentage of domains hosted on shared IPs. We consider an IP address shared, if it hosts more
than 10 domain names [Tajalizadehkhoob et al. 2016].
This variable measures the ratio of domains that are hosted on shared IP addresses over the total
size of the hosted domains, in percent. This variable not only conveys information about the size of
the shared hosting infrastructure of the provider, but also about the provider’s business model: the
degree to which it relies on low-cost shared hosting services.
1Domains such as example.co.uk are considered to be second-level domains as well.
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Table I. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the full model for all
providers and providers in the sample of twins
min mean median max sd
for all data points (n = 45,358)
# assigned IPs [log10] 0 3.1 3.2 8.4 1.2
# IPs hosting domains [log10] 0 1.8 1.7 6.2 0.8
# hosted domains [log10] 0 2.0 1.8 7.6 0.9
% domains hosted on shared IPs 0 51.0 59.0 100 37.1
# phishing domains in APWG 0 2.8 0 11,455 91.3
# phishing domains in Cyscon 0 0.9 0 5,515 37.4
for statistical twins (n = 210)
# assigned IPs [log10] 0.3 4.0 4.0 7.5 1.4
# IPs hosting domains [log10] 0.3 3.0 3.0 5.6 1.2
# hosted domains [log10] 1.5 3.9 3.7 7.6 1.2
% domains hosted on shared IPs 0 78.6 87.9 99.3 22.3
# phishing domains in APWG 0 159.2 3 9,805 967.6
# phishing domains in Cyscon 0 54.8 1 3,819 375.0
4.3.2. “Statistical twins” sampling method. It is not possible or desirable to collect data at scale
for all factors in Figure 3. For example, pricing information must be collected manually. It involves
search, interpretation, and human judgment. Applying a standardized procedure is too costly for
the entire population of 45,358 hosting providers for some of these variables. Even collecting some
technical indicators, such as the number of Wordpress installation on all websites of every hosting
provider, are inefficient to collect in bulk; perhaps even unethical, because it imposes a cost on the
scanned networks.
For this reason, we employ a data-driven sampling strategy and select a small set of homogeneous
“statistical twins” for which we can freely collect as much information as possible. The steps are as
follows:
(i) We start with a set of randomly and uniformly selected seed data points (105 hosting providers)
for which we have collected pricing information. Let S be the set of seed data points and T be
the total set (or population) of providers. The random seed should ensure a good coverage of the
population.
(ii) We calculate the distance between all the data points in S and data points in T using the Eu-
clidean distance between all explanatory variables collected for the entire population. This results
in a distance matrix of 105 rows and around 45 k columns.
(iii) For each of the 105 providers inS , we select the closest match; that is the provider in set T that
has the minimum distance to the provider in setS , in terms of variables in Table I.
(iv) This results in a set of rich data points R consisting of 105 homogeneous statistical twins and
206 unique hosting providers in total, where a few providers became part of two twins. We further
use setR as our (notoriously biased) sample to study the effect of additional factors on abuse. We
account for the bias in the analysis (Section 7).
(v) We collect additional variables for all elements inR.
While the method is economical and increases the information gained per effort, it comes with
some limitations. First, it is unlikely to spot outliers simply because there is nothing to pair up
against an extreme hosting provider such as Amazon. Second, it assumes that data points in dense
regions of the population do not systematically differ from those in sparser regions, where the prob-
ability of finding twins is lower. Third, it requires that the bias introduced by the selection strategy
is approximately linear. Non-linear bias correction is possible in principle, but requires prior infor-
mation on the functional form.
4.3.3. Variables collected for a sample of providers. The below variables are collected only for
the providers inR, as explained in Section 4.3.2.
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Fig. 2. Number of twins per country combination
Country. For the providers in R, we use MaxMind API to identify where the majority of IP
addresses are located. In Figure 2, we show the general coverage of twins in our data. For instance,
there are 16 twins with both providers located in US while there is 1 twin with one provider located
in Britain and the other in Japan. The figure indicates a good variation in the geo-location of twins
in our sample data.
ICT development index. The ITU publishes country-level variables that proxy the develop-
ment in information and communication technology (ICT) using several indicators [International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) 2014]. (This and the previous variable came into view for our
enriched data points, but they could also be economically collected for the whole population.)
Popularity index. We use Alexa’s one million top-ranked domains as a proxy for online popu-
larity. A provider is assumed to host more popular content when more domains are on the list. If
attacker behavior is not completely random, one may expect that providers with more popular sites
are targeted more in order to compromise domains and set up phishing sites.
The popularity index per provider in calculated by aggregating the Alexa ranks of second-level
domains in our sample R. We first reverse the Alexa ranks per domain, that is the most popular
Alexa domain gets the rank 1,000,000. We then calculate a score per provider by summing up the
base-10 logarithm of the reverse rank of all ranked websites. This score combines website (i.e.,
customer) popularity and the density of popular sites at a hosting provider and the method allows
us to account for extreme popularity of large providers.
Time in business. Time is business is a proxy for how experienced a provider is. We collect
this information by querying the WHOIS database for the registration date of the provider’s own
domain name. Missing values were entered if we could not find the website or there was no public
registration date in WHOIS. We cross-checked the results with the Internet Archive for all data points
[Web-Archive 2016]. Almost all domains in our sample were captured by Web-archive a couple of
months after the day they were registered.
Pricing. Finding comparable pricing information for hosting providers is complicated. We visit
the provider’s website and collect prices for the least expensive hosting plan on offer, as an indicator
to tell ‘bottom-end’ from ‘top-end’ apart. We hypothesize that providers with cheaper hosting plans
have fewer resources and more vulnerable customers, so higher phishing counts. We converted all
prices to US dollars by taking the 2015 average exchange rate of the local currency to USD. Price
information for providers is missing if (i) we could not find the provider’s website; (ii) the prices
are not available online; and (iii) we do not receive a reply to our inquiries through other channels.
Wordpress use. Previous studies suggest that domains with popular content management sys-
tems (CMS) in general have higher odds of being compromised for phishing attacks [Vasek et al.
2016]. Therefore, we hypothesize that the more Wordpress websites a provider host, the higher is
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(e) Wordpress use
Fig. 3. Visualization of the variation of additional variables within and between sampled twins
the chance of being a target of phishing attacks. We use this as a proxy of the extent to which
Wordpress as a popular and targeted software is used per provider. To collect data on Wordpress
installations per provider, we randomly sample 2 % of the domains of each provider in R. This
results in 1,398,928 domains. We then use WPScan, a black box Wordpress vulnerability scanner
developed and supported by Sucuri, to determine if a domain uses Wordpress [WPScan 2016]. The
variable Wordpress use is calculated by taking the ratio of scanned domains that have Wordpress
installation over all scanned domains excluding those that we were unable to scan.
To raise confidence in the selection of twins and facilitate the interpretation of estimated coeffi-
cients, in Figure 3 we show a collection of plots visualizing the variance within and between twins
for the additional variables. Circles display the value of the provider with lower value in a twin, and
are the basis for sorting all twins horizontally. Triangles display the respective value of the provider
with higher value.
In general, the plots suggest a broad enough coverage of data points in the twins. More specifi-
cally, as Figure 3(a) demonstrates, variance of the ICT development index decreases with increasing
the base level (The provider shown with circle, those with lower value in a twin). This is probably
due the concentration of hosting providers (and hence twins) in a few large and highly developed
countries, as witnessed in the country pairings displayed in Figure 2. The popularity index exhibits
moderate differences at all levels (Fig. 3(b)). This indicates that the sampling strategy accounts well
for the heterogeneity in the size of hosting providers, which is also included in the index calcula-
tion. At the same time, the remaining variation allows for the statistical identification of potentially
influencing factors within the twins. Also time in business is very “healthy” in this regard, with a
smaller difference for values between providers in twins which are in business since the .com ages
(Figure 3(c)). The differences in price are rather small and exhibit occasional spikes (Figure 3(d)).
This may reflect the generally low cost of the cheapest package of one of the twins, differences in
business models at the spikes, and potential issues related to comparing US dollar amounts among
countries with very different labor and infrastructure costs. Finally, the Wordpress use also shows a
good mix of variation within and between twins, increasing the chance of extracting a meaningful
signal if the indicator has explanatory power (Figure 3(e)).
The general coverage of the rich data pointsR of the populationT is best assessed by comparing
the descriptive statistics of the four explanatory variables and the response variables, which are
available for the entire population. This information is included in the lower half of Table I.
5. MODELING PHISHING COUNTS
We now propose a statistical model to analyze to what extent the structural properties of hosting
providers can explain the concentration of abuse in their networks, for the case of phishing.
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5.1. Regression model
Abuse is measured by counting abuse events per provider. These counts consists of non-negative
integers that arise from a direct observation of a point process. In a minimal model, the underlying
process is assumed to be stationary and homogeneous, with i.i.d. arrival times for abuse events and
thus can be modeled with a Poisson distribution.
Let us define our response variable Yi as the number of abused second-level domains hosted by
provider i, for i= 1, . . . ,n, with n being the total number of hosting providers. LetYi follow a Poisson
distribution with parameter λ ≥ 0,
Pr{Yi = k}= e
−λiλ ki
k!
, ∀k ∈ N∪{0}. (1)
The Poisson distribution has equal mean and variance E [Yi] = var [Yi] = λi.
In the log-linear version of the general linear model (GLM), λi is modeled as:
ln(λi) = β0+ x′iβ = β0+
k
∑
j=1
xi jβ j, (2)
where β0 is the intercept, xi j, j= 1, . . . ,k, are explanatory variables representing the structural prop-
erties that drive the response variable Yi, and β j are parameters to be estimated with maximum like-
lihood (ML). Statistical hypothesis tests can tell if a parameter β j significantly differs from zero. If
the null hypothesis is rejected, the corresponding explanatory variable is considered influential and
the parameter’s sign and magnitude can be interpreted.
5.2. Model Goodness of fit
The fitted values produced by inserting the ML estimates βˆ into Eq. (2) will not match the values
of the phishing data perfectly, chiefly because the data are realizations and the fitted values are
parameters of Poisson distributions. The discrepancy between the model and the data is a measure
of the inadequacy of the model. Several measures exist to assess the goodness of fit of GLMs such
as Log-likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), dispersion parameter of the Poisson model
and R-squared. Here we discuss a few of them that are more specific to our way of using the Poisson
model.
Table II. GLM for count of phishing domains in APWG for all the hosting providers
Response Variable: Count of phishing domains
Poisson with Log Link Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of assigned IP addresses 1.186∗∗∗ −1.665∗∗∗ −0.728∗∗∗ −0.768∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Number of IP addresses hosting domains 3.623∗∗∗ 1.104∗∗∗ 1.570∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
Number of hosted domains 1.686∗∗∗ 1.238∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Percentage of domains hosted 0.027∗∗∗
on shared IP addresses (0.0003)
Constant −0.122∗∗∗ −3.594∗∗∗ −2.732∗∗∗ −5.072∗∗∗ −6.755∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.024)
Observations 45,358 45,358 45,358 45,358 45,358
Log Likelihood −223,113.400 −514,546.600 −236,442.400 −117,601.700 −111,570.800
Akaike Inf. Crit. 446,228.800 1,029,097.000 472,890.800 235,211.400 223,151.700
Dispersion 2934.775 619.708 554.695 12.149 13.166
Pseudo R2 0.221 0.648 0.831 0.841
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Standard errors in brackets
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Over-dispersionRecall that the Poisson model assumes equal mean and variance for the response
variable, that is var [Yi] = φE [Yi] = φλi, with φ
!
= 1, where φ is a dispersion parameter. However,
this assumption is often “violated” in practice; that is, a likelihood function which leaves φ as a
parameter to be estimated (φˆ ) fits the data much better. In case of heterogeneous count variables,
φˆ > 1 indicates signs of over-dispersion, which can be interpreted as unobserved heterogeneity in
terms of a missing structural factor that leads to concentrations of observable events.
One might approach a model’s over-dispersion by starting from a Poisson model and adding a
multiplicative random effect to represent unobserved heterogeneity. This leads to a negative bino-
mial GLM. However, even if both parameters of the assumed negative binomial distribution are
correctly specified, if the distribution of the response variable is not in fact the negative binomial,
then the maximum-likelihood estimator becomes inconsistent [Cameron and Trivedi 1990].
The literature suggests that in the absence of a precise mechanism that produces the over-
dispersion, it is safe to assume var(Yi) = φλi, for positive values of φ . This approach is generally
considered robust since even significant deviations have only a minor effect on the fitted values, their
standard errors, confidence intervals, and p-values of hypothesis tests [Heinzl and Mittlböck 2003].
Moreover, over-dispersion, as a sign of unobserved heterogeneity, is exactly what we are interested
in, in this paper: answering the question to what extent explanatory factors can explain differences
between abuse levels of hosting providers. Over-dispersion it is an indicator for structural variance
in our model. Any attempt to compensate it with the choice of more complex distribution functions,
such as negative binomial or zero-inflated Poisson, may hide the very signal we are looking for.
The dispersion parameter φ of a Poisson regression model is calculated using the chi-square
statistics χ2 divided by degrees of freedom, as it is more robust against outliers [Mittlböck 2002].
φˆ =
χ2
(n− k−1) =∑i
(
yi− λˆi
)2
λˆi · (n− k−1)
, (3)
with n being the number of observations and k the number of coefficients. y = (y1, ...,yn)′ are the
observed values of the response variable; λˆ = (λˆ1, ..., λˆn)′ are the corresponding predicted values
under the fitted model, respectively.
Pseudo R-Squared A popular measure to assess the fraction of variance explained by a lin-
ear model is the R-squared statistic. Similar statistics that take values between 0 (not better than
intercept-only model) and 1 (perfect fit) have been proposed for GLMs and are called pseudo R-
Squared. According to [Heinzl and Mittlböck 2003], a pseudo R-Squared measure for Poisson mod-
els that takes the effect of over-dispersion into account is given by
R2 = 1− D(y, λˆ )+ k · φˆ
D(y,Y¯ )
, (4)
where D(y, λˆ ) is the deviance of the fitted model, D(y,Y¯ ) is the deviance of the intercept-only
model, φˆ is the estimated dispersion (Eq. (3)), k is the number of covariates fitted, (excluding inter-
cept) and Y¯ = 1n ∑
n
i=1 yi.
5.3. Model specifications
After selecting the proper regression model and discussing goodness of fit measures, we choose
to fit different specifications of the model with a step-wise inclusion of the variables that capture
providers’ structural properties. For each of the variables, we hypothesize the direction of its relation
with phishing counts.
We expect that the number of phishing counts increases as the ‘Number of hosted domains’ and
‘Number of IP addresses hosting domains’ increase. Both variables are correlated and measure
some aspects of the size of a provider. We may expect that the coefficient sizes decline if both enter
the model together, but it is unlikely that one of them becomes redundant. In case of ‘Number of
assigned IP addresses’, the assumption is slightly different since the more assigned IP addresses
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does not necessarily mean that the provider uses them for web hosting. In contrast, we found that
the business model of providers with larger assigned IP space is closer to a broadband provider who
uses only a very small portion of its assigned space for web-hosting. Accordingly, since phishing
attack – as an instance of abuse – directly depends on web-hosting, we expect providers with large
‘Number of assigned IP addresses’, to have less phishing events in a specification where size is
already controlled for with the two other variables.
In addition, note that our log-transformation of the top three variables shown in Table II, perfectly
matches with the log-link function of the Poisson model.
We expect that the variable ‘Percentage of domains hosted on shared IP addresses’ correlates
positively with the phishing counts of providers due to commonly known vulnerabilities of shared
hosting services [Nikiforakis et al. 2011; Aaron and Rasmussen 2015b], assuming that attackers
would go for targets that are easier to compromise.
5.4. Estimation results
We construct several models by performing a step-wise inclusion of the explanatory variables ex-
plained in Section 5.3. A summary of these regression models is presented in Table II. The table
contains 5 models with estimated coefficients of explanatory variables in each model. Each coeffi-
cient demonstrates the amount of variance in phishing counts that a variable can explain given other
variables in the model.
As we move from model (2) to (5), we aim to improve our models in terms of goodness of fit
metrics explained in Section 5.2. Likewise, the pseudo R-squared values increase when explana-
tory variables are added from model (2) to (5). More specifically, with the four size and business-
related variables, we are able to explain 84 % of the variance in abuse counts across 45,358 hosting
providers with simple structural properties of providers. One should note that the dispersion param-
eter φˆ across the models has been reduced from 2934.77 for the intercept-only model to 13.17 in
model (5). In addition to other factors, the significance and signs of the estimated coefficient for
explanatory variables do not change between model (3) and model (5), which further indicates we
can safely take model (5) as our final model.
The results in model (5) clearly suggests that the number of phishing sites increases as the ‘Num-
ber of hosted domains’ and ‘Number of IP addresses hosting domains’ increases. One should note
that these two variables together capture the attack surface of the hosting providers for the case of
phishing attacks, the best. Hence, the results demonstrates that for larger attack surfaces, there are
more phishing websites.
As hypothesized, ‘Percentage of domains hosted on shared IP addresses’ show a statistically
significant relation with the abuse counts, indicating that having more domains on shared servers
make a provider more exposed to phishing attacks. The ‘Number of assigned IP addresses’ shows
a statistically significant negative relation with the abuse count, as expected when controlling for
size. As pointed out earlier, a manual inspection of the providers with large ‘Number of assigned
IP addresses’ suggests that they are mostly broadband providers who offer web hosting only as a
very small part of their business. Therefore, the negative sign of ‘Percentage of domains hosted on
shared IP addresses’ works in line with our hypothesis of having more web hosting domains and
IPs as attack surface, increases the number of phishing victims.
In addition, the coefficients and pseudo R-squared values in the models (2) to (5) further confirm
the point we made earlier in the introduction of the paper that a simple bi-variate correlation or a
naive normalization of abuse with one size metric, while neglecting other size properties, cannot
comprehensively explain the variance in abuse counts.
Taking model (2) as an example, the value of estimated coefficient for ‘Number of assigned IP
addresses’ suggest that increasing this variable by one unit (i.e., one decimal order of magnitude),
multiplies the number of expected abuse counts by e1.186 = 3.273. However, a naive normalization
of abuse (abuse counts divided by network size) would have assumed a coefficient equal to 1 for the
‘Number of assigned IP addresses’. In the multivariate models, several size indicators offset each
other, making the estimation more precise. In addition, in model (2) where ‘Number of assigned
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IP addresses’ is the only size variable, we are only able to explain 22% of the variance in phishing
counts whereas by adding three other size metrics, the explained variance is improved up to 84%.
5.5. Quantitative interpretation
To illustrate the economic significance of the parameters in the fitted model (5), we familiarize the
reader with three scenarios. The scenarios are based on hosting provider groups discussed in [Ta-
jalizadehkhoob et al. 2016], which is medium, small and large hosting providers.
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Fig. 4. Partial effects of one unit increase of predictors on expected phishing counts in model (5) of Table II (mind the
different scales)
For each scenario, we show the partial effect of changes in the abuse counts given each of the
explanatory variables (see Figure 4).
In the first scenario (scenario 1), all explanatory variables are set at their median as a baseline
situation (see Figure 4). In scenario 2, the baseline shows a typical small shared hosting provider
with a small number of assigned IP addresses (0.47: ≈ 100.47 IPs assigned), a small number of IP
addresses used for hosting domains (0.47: ≈ 100.47 IPs ), a small number of hosted domains (1.95:
≈ 101.95 domains) and a high percentage of domains hosted on shared IP addresses (100%).
In scenario 3, the baseline situation indicates a large web hosting provider with huge number
assigned IP address space (6.85: ≈ 106.85, large IP address space used for hosting domains (5.67:
≈ 105.67 IPs assigned), large amount of hosted domain names (5.68: ≈ 105.68 domains) and very
small percentage of domains hosted on shared IP addresses (0.48%). Apparently, this is common
case for web hosting providers that are mostly offering dedicated services [Tajalizadehkhoob et al.
2016].
The bars for each of the scenarios in Figure 4 illustrate the change in the expected count of abuse
events for a unit change in each of the explanatory variables, while holding the others constant.
Given the coefficients for the explanatory variables in Model (5) in Table II, one can easily ob-
serve that changes in ‘Number of IP addresses hosting domains’ while other variables are constant,
changes the phishing counts the most, while the effect of one unit change in ‘Percentage of domains
hosted on shared IP addresses’ on the phishing counts is small although statistically significant.
Obviously, evaluating how effective providers are in keeping phishing sites off their networks is
important for developing policies and best practices. Absolute concentrations of abuse are still use-
ful, of course. Even if they reflect structural factors, those providers could be asked to go beyond the
security practices of the industry, because of their prominent position. Such a call is less plausible,
however, if attackers can easily switch among the thousands of providers, as has been found in other
work [Levchenko et al. 2011].
Rather than looking at absolute counts of abuse alone, measuring the amount of abuse relative to
the providers’ structural properties adds valuable information. Figure 5.5 visualizes the difference
between actual phishing counts and the counts predicted by our model. Providers below the line are
performing better than average and the distance tells us by how much.
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Fig. 5. Observed and predicted number of phishing domains for Model (5) in Table II
6. ADDITIONAL PROVIDER STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
In model (5) of Table II, we see that around 84% of the variance in phishing counts is explained
by some of the structural properties of providers, namely, four variables related to size and business
model of the hosting providers.
In this section we continue with interpreting regression models, this time on a sample of the
rich data points (set R) as described in Section 4.3.2. Recall that we need to adjust the estimation
method by introducing two sets of fixed-effects, (i) for level differences between statistical twins and
(ii) for level differences between countries. Fixed effects take away known linear dependence in the
residuals. This is essential to obtain accurate test statistics (which assume independent residuals).
Sources of dependence are within twins due to the selection strategy and within countries due to the
inclusion of country-level variables.
We define the model with (one set of) fixed-effects as:
ln(λi j) = βxi j+ · · ·+δi, (5)
where β is the estimated coefficient for xi j, xi j are explanatory variables collected for hosting
providers in set R and δi is the “fixed-effect” parameter [Cameron and Trivedi 2013]. Subscript i
refers to different twins and j ∈ {1,2} refers to different measurements within each twin, i.e., the
same variable measured at different hosting providers belonging to the same twin.
The model uses variables explained in Section 4.3.3 as predictors. We add two fixed-effects to
the model – twin and country – by fitting a separate dummy variable as a predictor for each class
of each variable. The twin fixed effect controls for the bias introduced by selecting similar samples.
The country fixed effect prevents undue dependence in the residuals if country-level predictors are
included. In addition, in case of missing values per explanatory variable, we perform a list-wise
exclusion on a twin, if one of providers in is missing. This further reduces the number of pairs per
model depending on missing values of the included variables.
With fixed effects, the definition of pseudo R-squared requires some reflection. It is possible to
use an intercept-only baseline, which results in artificially high pseudo R-squared values because
the level differences of the fixed effects are counted as “explained”. A more conservative measure
is to use the fixed-effects-only model as baseline. Table III shows the summary of our results.
Table III contains two baseline models (model (1) and (2)). While the former only models twins
as a fixed-effect, the later models both twins and countries as fixed effects. Model (3) broadens
model (2) by fitting more explanatory variables with fewer missing values. In model (4) we add all
the explanatory variables collected for the set of rich datapoints (R), except for the ICT development
index, having only twins as a fixed effect. In addition to variables in model (4), in model (5) we add
ICT development index, setting both twin and country as fixed effects.
The regression results in Table III indicate that by including both twins and country as fixed ef-
fects, keeping in mind that the datapoints in set R are already homogeneous in terms of other vari-
ables, we are able to explain around 77% of the variance in phishing counts for the twins (pseudo
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Table III. GLM for count phishing domains in APWG for the “statisti-
cal twins”
Response Variable
Count of phishing domains
Poisson with Log Link Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Price per year 0.0003 −0.007∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.001)
Popularity index 0.001∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
(in thousands) (0.000) (0.002) (0.01)
Time in business −0.017∗ −0.059∗∗∗ 0.015
(0.007) (0.005) (0.012)
ICT dev. index 0.951∗∗∗ −165.065
(0.214) (> 103)
Wordpress use 5.858∗∗∗ 2.203∗∗∗
(0.271) (0.450)
Twin fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed-effects No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 210 210 180 84 82
Log Likelihood −2,783.157 −1,111.825 −966.249 −795.838 −249.780
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,776.315 2,521.650 2,192.499 1,683.677 641.560
Dispersion 40.133 25.770 27.352 31.554 11.243
Pseudo R2 -0.055 0.625 0.772
Total pseudo R2 0.974 0.991 0.992 0.966 0.995
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Standard errors in brackets
R-squared value). Note that this variance is the 77% of the 16% unexplained variance that is re-
mained in model (5) of Table II, for the full population of providers. The results further highlights
the importance of accounting for other –non-size related– structural properties of providers, while
explaining the variance in concentration of abuse.
Even though we have around hundred fixed-effects, we still get very clear and significant results
for the main effects. In addition, by moving from model (1) to model (5) in Table III, we are reducing
the amount of unexplained heterogeneity (model’s dispersion) from 40.133 to 11.243.
As hypothesized, we see a significant negative relation between the price of hosting and phishing
counts in model (5). That is, if we increase price by one unit holding the other variables constant, the
phishing count will be multiplied by e(−0.007) = 0.99 which means that the cheaper a service is, the
more the hosting provider is prone to phishing attacks. Interestingly, variable ‘Price per year’ shows
a different relation in model (4) where we do not control for cross-country differences. This change
is expected, however, as properties of hosting markets in different countries can differ a lot, which
eventually influences the cost structure of the country in regards to hosting services. In addition, the
cost of a hosting plan is relative to the economy of the provider’s country. Conversion of prices in a
specific country to USD, if not controlled for the country differences, can be very crude. Variables
‘Wordpress use’ and ‘Popularity index’ also show a significant positive relation with phishing count
indicating that more Wordpress sites per provider translates to more phishing attacks, which is quite
logical considering the fact that the majority of phishing sites are compromised machines. One unit
increase in ‘Wordpress use’ while holding other variables constant, multiplies the phishing counts
by e(2.203) = 9.052. Similarly, the more popular websites of a provider is on average, the most that
provider is a victim of phishing attacks.
For ‘ICT development index’, we observe both a sign and significance change from model (3) to
model (5). This can be understood by looking back at the distribution of twins in Fig. 3(b), where
the gray color marks the twins that were excluded from Model (5) due to missing values. From the
figure it is visible that the 100 observations that were excluded because of missing price information
are clustered among lower developed countries, thereby removing the variance needed to find the
effect of ICT development. The effect is also easily observable in Model (3). Without the price
variable, ‘ICT development index’ shows a significant and positive relation.
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Now the question is, to what extent does our sample reflect the population? Looking back to our
sampling strategy, in model (5) of Table II, we have a model that explained 84% of heterogeneity;
so looking for neighbors in the projection of model (5) increases the chance of getting twins that
are very comparable for all the factors that we cannot observe and are already somewhat correlated
to size measures. This means that the enriched data points contain more valuable information than
others from the total population. However, since instead of a totally random sample, we are creating
twins of providers, our targeted sampling strategy might introduce possible biases. In order to deal
with that bias, we make an assumption that the bias is linear in the modeling domain, i.e., can
be captured by linear fixed effects parameters. In Section 7, we further perform additional cross-
validations, to check for possible biases our methodology might have introduced.
7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
During the course of our analysis, we pointed out a few assumptions that we have made, most
notably about the impact of the deviations from the Poisson model due to over-dispersion; and about
the impact of measurement errors in the abuse data. In this section we address these two concerns.
Regarding the first assumption, we use a simulation study to perform a robustness check on our
size estimates. To check for possible errors in the phishing data, we cross validate with another data
source.
7.1. Size estimates
Assume attack events are Poisson and the only structural factor that affects them is the size, i.e.,
the attack surface. In the absence of perfect information of the true attack surface, it can only be
approximated in practice through the size variables we used in Table II. Now we would like to
study: to which extent are deviations from Poisson observable only by using the imperfect size
estimations? The precise steps towards estimating new models for phishing abuse counts using
imperfect size estimations are as follows:
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(Right) Error bars of the simulated regression coefficients
We generate a true size variable that is following normal distribution using mean and standard
deviation of variable ‘Number of hosted domains’. We then simulate attack events –hits– where
the phishing counts follow a Poisson distribution (Pois(λsim)). where λsim is the mean number of
phishing domains. We then build the simulated size variables used in model (3) of Table II, namely,
‘Number of hosted domains’, ‘Number of IP addresses hosting domains’, ‘Number of the assigned
IP addresses’ by adding random noise (N(µ fi ,σ fi),∀i ∈ {1..3}) to our true size variable. µ fi and σ fi
are estimated using the mean and standard deviation of the corresponding explanatory size variables.
We generate 1,000 times the synthetic data representing both the size and the dependent variables,
and model them using the GLM regression specified in model (4) (see Table II). Then we calculate
the dispersion parameter for each one of the simulated models using Eq.(3). Figure 7.1 shows the
density distribution of the dispersion parameter for each of the Poisson models using simulated
size measures. The model indicates that the dispersion parameter is on average greater than 1. The
dispersion parameter value is far from the dispersion parameter that we obtained using our real
dataset in model (4) of Table II. This however is expected since the real size estimates are far from
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being perfect and contain several outliers. Moreover, the over-dispersion in simulated size variables
indicates that some part of the over-dispersion in model (4) of Table II – probably not everything –
can be attributed to the approximate measurement of the size estimates. Finally, Figure 7.1 displays
the coefficients of the 1,000 model fits as error bars. The red diamonds are the coefficients obtained
with the full Poisson model. The coefficients follow the same trend as in the model given the over-
dispersion, which validates its robustness.
7.2. Phishing data
Given the known limitations using blacklists as abuse data, e.g., the lack of overlap [Metcalf and
Spring 2015], we ran our approach against an alternative data source: the Cyscon phishing data.
This allows us to see how sensitive our results are to specific data sources.
Similar to before, we model arrival rate of phishing counts using a Poisson GLM with log-link
function with size and business model predictors as used in model (4) and model (5) of Table II. The
result of the two final models is displayed in Table IV. We then model the statistical twins in the set
of rich datapoints R, having two sets of fixed effects for differences between twins and countries.
The results are shown in Table V. Model (1) and (2) contain the same explanatory variables as
Model (4) and (5) of Table III. Interestingly, and reassuringly, the resulting estimated coefficients
and significance levels for both of the analysis are quite similar to those of the model with APWG
data.
Table IV. GLM for count of phishing domains in Cyscon
data for all the providers
Response Variable
Count of phishing domains
Poisson-Log Link Function
(1) (2)
Number of assigned IPs −0.719∗∗∗ −0.776∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.012)
Number of IPs hosting domains 1.170∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018)
Number of hosted domains 1.663∗∗∗ 1.115∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011)
Percentage of domains hosted on 0.033∗∗∗
shared IPs (0.001)
Constant −6.432∗∗∗ −8.488∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.045)
Observations 45,358 45,358
Log Likelihood −49,763.500 −47,208.470
Akaike Inf. Crit. 99,535.010 94,426.950
Dispersion 20.153 17.444
Pseudo R2 0.791 0.803
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors in brackets
Table V. GLM for count of phishing domains in
Cyscon data for the providers in the “statistical twins”
Response Variable
Count of p hishing domains
Poisson with Log Link F unction
(1) (2)
Price per year 0.0003 −0.012∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.002)
Popularity index (in thousands) 0.02∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.01)
Time in business −0.048∗∗∗ 0.004
(0.010) (0.037)
ICT dev. index 13.610
(> 103)
Wordpress use 7.848∗∗∗ 3.079∗∗
(0.583) (1.125)
Pair Fixed-Effect Yes Yes
Country Fixed-Effect No Yes
Observations 84 82
Log Likelihood −476.818 −145.676
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,045.635 433.352
Dispersion 20.712 2.993
Fixed-effects Pseudo R2 0.538 0.889
Total Pseudo R2 0.970 0.987
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
Standard errors in brackets
8. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
The core question of this paper is: to what extent are abuse levels determined by the security efforts
of individual providers versus being a function of structural properties of the industry? We now
summarize our findings and discuss the implications of the results.
We reduced the abuse attribution error, by empirically studying the population of hosting
providers for the first time, which are defined based on actors who operate the IP space rather
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than technical resources such as ASes. Next, we advanced the existing work that uses simple re-
gression analysis by taking disentangle a variety of factors and errors at work in abuse counts. By
building several GLM models for phishing abuse counts as a response variable, we demonstrated
that a handful of providers’ structural properties, such as domain names space size, IP space size
used for web-hosting and size of their shared hosting business, can already account for 84% of the
variation in phishing counts. These variables are easily measurable at scale and capture the ‘attack
surface’ of providers along with aspects of their business model.
Additionally, we presented previously unstudied factors, such as pricing, time-in-business of a
provider, and the amount of Wordpress sites per provider and others collected via a tailored sampling
approach, can explain a further 77% of the remaining variation in phishing.
Our findings suggest that abuse rates for phishing reflect an overall bad harvest rather than being
driven by rotten apples who don’t care about security. Our approach enhances more informative
comparison of providers. In other words, it generates comparative abuse metrics by controlling
for the structural differences among providers. Such relative metrics are more suited to evaluate
countermeasures than absolute counts and concentrations of abuse.
When structural factors are so dominant in driving abuse, it undermines the common narrative
to call for better security practices of apparently under-performing actors or for even more radical
interventions, such as sanctions. However, our findings do not limit the action space for policy.
Quite the contrary: data-driven policy could try to improve the factors identified as influential, e. g.,
require higher security standards at providers who host more popular websites. Furthermore, relative
abuse metrics can, in themselves, incentivize better security [Konte et al. 2015; He et al. 2015]. In
sum: throwing out a few rotten apples might appear more tractable, but producing a better harvest
is definitely possible. We discuss below how future work can directly apply our approach to answer
these questions for other forms of hosting abuse.
Here, we should also acknowledge several limitations of our work. First, our method is geared
towards identifying the main explanatory factors in the population of hosting providers. Our con-
clusions should not be misinterpreted as evidence that there are no misbehaving hosting providers,
only that their impact on the population of phishing incidents is surprisingly limited.
Second, the presence of certain unobserved factors, including attacker behavior, is also a limita-
tion of this work. That being said, we have considerably reduced the likelihood of these being major
factors in the abuse patterns, as witnessed by the variance explained by the structural properties.
Third, certain structural factors might indirectly capture some information about security efforts.
One could argue, for example, that the price model chosen by a provider might also signal how many
resources are available for security. On the other hand, the fact that 84% of the variance is explained
by purely technical structural properties, unrelated to price, suggests that also this impact is limited.
Only more direct observation of provider security efforts can establish how it is related to price.
We have “measured” effort only as a latent factor in the unexplained variance of our model. Future
work could try to measure it more directly, via surveys or experiments with abuse notifications and
takedown speed [Li et al. 2016; Cetin et al. 2015].
A final limitation is that our empirical evidence is specific to phishing. Our modeling approach
is agnostic to the type abuse, however. The independent variables and model design are not spe-
cific to phishing. Future work can use our approach to identify the impact of these structural and
business model factors on other types of abuse in the hosting market. For some sources, like drive-
by-download sites, we expect similar patterns. For other, more idiosyncratic types of abuse, like
long-living botnet C&C servers, we might expect different patterns. There, we might indeed find
that rotten apples drive the abuse rates, rather than a bad overall harvest.
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